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DISTRIBUTED STOVL OPERATIONS AND  
AIR-MOBILITY SUPPORT
 This article examines the logistical support requirements of distributed short-takeoff–vertical-landing (STOVL) operations (DSOs) by U.S. Marine Corps 
F-35B Lightning II fighters, and alternative solutions to fulfilling those require-
ments. As presently envisioned by Marine planners, DSOs will improve the op-
erational flexibility, survivability, and lethality of F-35Bs by operating them from 
constantly shifting networks of mobile forward arming and refueling points (M-
FARPs). Current Marine Corps planning calls for deployed Marine expeditionary 
brigades (MEBs) to support DSOs both from the 
ships comprising their sea bases and by using their 
organic ground and aviation transportation assets. 
Studies show that this “organic” support concept is 
viable up to a multisquadron scale of operations.
However, this article suggests that a joint lo-
gistics approach based on U.S. Air Force (USAF) 
air-mobility assets can offer significant advantages 
in the flexibility and sustainability of DSOs and 
in reducing their risks, particularly in the face 
of enemies possessing sophisticated antiaccess/
area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities. This article 
also assesses that the addition of a medium-sized 
tanker/transport aircraft would greatly enhance 
the capability of the current and planned USAF 
air-mobility fleet to support DSOs at the widest 
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possible range of places that Marine Corps and combatant commanders might 
want to establish M-FARPs. Given the possibility that DSOs may offer the best, 
or even the only, opportunity to base fifth-generation fighters forward in strong 
A2/AD environments, the value of assessing these logistical alternatives is clear.
From an operational and logistical perspective, it is important to understand 
that sustained and successful DSOs will draw on the support of other Marine 
and joint forces and operations. Deception operations in the form of decoy fa-
cilities, along with counterintelligence signals and misinformation, will degrade 
and delay enemy efforts to locate and target active DSO elements with enough 
certainty to justify releases against them of high-value, short-supply weapons 
systems. Marine and host-nation security, combat-engineering, and logistics sup-
port will be needed to defend and sustain DSO units in the presence of differing 
combinations of enemy air and ground threats. F-35Bs operating from M-FARPs 
will often achieve their best successes as elements of broader air-component 
information, surveillance, reconnaissance, counterair and air-defense missile, 
and counterair operations. Although operating F-35Bs from M-FARPs could 
reduce demands on air-refueling (AR) forces, tanker support also can enhance 
the operational advantages of forward basing. Thus, while this article focuses on 
M-FARP logistics, logistical and operational planners should be aware of the full 
contexts and costs of such operations.
CONCEPT AND OPERATIONAL VIABILITY
Marine Corps planners expect DSOs to enhance the depth and power of F-35B 
operations through frequent and unpredictable relocation of their bases. More 
specifically, the 2015 Marine Aviation Plan explains that “DSO asymmetrically 
moves inside of the enemy targeting cycle by using multiple mobile forward 
arming and refueling points . . . [u]sing existing infrastructure (multi-lane roads, 
small airfields, damaged main bases) . . . [to provide] strategic depth and op-
erational resiliency to the joint force . . . [and provide] the Marine Air-Ground 
Task Force (MAGTF) with game-changing strategic access inside of the enemy 
weapons engagement zone.”1 The success of the concept, therefore, rests on the 
ability of Marine commanders to shift force elements among networks of austere 
bases faster than enemies can locate, target, and release attacks against them.2 
These MAGTF assets may include actual and decoy M-FARPs, sea bases, mobile 
distribution sites (MDSs) linking sea bases to M-FARPs logistically, and the full 
range of MAGTF air transport, amphibious craft, and trucks to maintain robust 
supply flows.3
Consider a conflict with China in the western Pacific as a potential—although 
one hopes an unlikely—worst case. This scenario offers insight into the viability 
of the DSO concept. Most importantly, China’s capacity to launch long-range 
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strikes against fleeting targets decreases significantly over distance. (1) Out to 
about four hundred nautical miles (nm) from its land bases, China can launch 
powerful, robust, all-capabilities (cyber, space, air, naval, and special-operations) 
“gorilla” strikes.4 These capabilities draw on magazines of about twelve hundred 
short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), several hundred medium-range ballistic 
missiles (MRBMs), hundreds of cruise missiles, and around 2,100 (six hundred 
modern) combat aircraft. (2) Beyond the “gorilla ring,” however, China’s strike 
capabilities shrink to its MRBMs and cruise missiles, a few squadrons of me-
dium bombers, and whatever fighter forces its limited AR fleet can project. (3) 
Beyond a thousand miles from the homeland, China’s standoff strike capabilities 
are limited to cruise missiles carried by surface ships, submarines, and handfuls 
of air-refueled bombers, all operating at great risk in contested battle zones and 
generally far from their weapons-reload facilities.
China’s ability to provide timely targeting data for M-FARP attacks also de-
creases quickly with increased distance from the homeland. Within the range of 
gorilla strikes, for example, China could search for DSO forces with a layered and 
robust network of information, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets. 
These would include satellite-borne radar, optical, and other sensors; seaborne 
and airborne line-of-sight radar and optical systems; special operations forces 
(SOF); local fifth columnists; and even news reporters looking for scoops. Al-
though some or all of these capabilities would be vulnerable to degradation or 
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Figure 1: Current-concept M-
FARP laydown map 
FIGURE 1
CURRENT-CONCEPT M-FARP LAYDOWN MAP
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destruction by U.S. and allied attacks, they could for some periods provide near-
continual, although not always detailed, surveillance of selected areas of interest.
Beyond the gorilla ring, however, China’s ISR capabilities would reside in a 
less-complete array of systems. These would consist of space and airborne sys-
tems, which would be sporadic, limited, or both in their ability to detect small 
and fleeting targets and subject to interference or interdiction; over-the-horizon, 
high-frequency radars, which are limited in their locational accuracy and target 
discrimination; and perhaps SOF and fifth-column elements, which would op-
erate under significant limitations on their movements and communications.5 
Even in the face of an enemy possessing a strong suite of these capabilities, such 
as China, the Marine DSO study anticipates that the daily shifting of actual and 
decoy M-FARPs could allow them to evade detection for six to nine hours from 
the time they set up for a new day’s operations.6 Given the frequent relocations of 
these FARPs, the short ti me spans for which aircraft would occupy them, and the 
ability of M-FARP ground crews to disperse aircraft service points at random, in-
formation that was six to nine hours old would be stale and unusable for targeting 
long-range systems at M-FARPs with any confidence of actually hitting anything 
of value. Under such circumstances, DSO forces could do their jobs and survive.
Finally, some assessments of China’s decision-making and command-and-
control (C2) cultures offer additional hope for the success of DSOs. Given the 
limited supply and strategic importance of China’s long-range missile and aircraft- 
attack systems, there is good reason to anticipate that the country’s leaders would 
be reluctant to expend them on elusive M-FARPs that might or might not have 
aircraft on them when their warheads struck. They might think it better to hold 
back those weapons for use against targets of greater operational and strategic 
value, such as C2 centers, major air bases, aircraft carriers, supply ships, and 
fixed surface-to-air missile sites. Also, a number of experts on Chinese strategic 
issues recognize significant disconnects in trust, understanding, goals, and coor-
dination between and within Chinese civil and military elites. These disconnects 
could delay or block weapons-release decisions against difficult or lesser-value 
targets.7 For instance, civil leaders determined to preserve the deterrent value of 
the few hundred DF-21 MRBMs in their arsenal might refuse military requests 
to use them in speculative attacks against troublesome M-FARPs. In a major 
conflict, these weapon-management and civil-military disconnects probably 
would not provide reliable sanctuary for DSO units, but they might help delay or 
minimize the frequency, weight, and timeliness of attacks against them.
LOGISTICAL CHALLENGES
Given reasonable expectations that DSOs can be executed successfully, logistics 
emerges as a critical challenge to the concept’s viability. DSOs involve a lot of 
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moving parts, substantial supply requirements, and shifting lines of communica-
tion. The recent Marine Corps study of the organic transportation assets available 
to a MEB to support DSOs reveals just how big and complex the logistical chal-
lenge can be (see figure 2).
The study was based on a reinforced complement of thirty-six F-35Bs op-
erating from a MEB sea base or an expeditionary airfield and supported by an 
onshore network of three MDSs, each supporting an operational M-FARP, plus 
one setting up and another breaking down.8 For logistics-planning purposes, the 
study postulated that the air-combat element would launch twenty-eight aircraft 
daily, each flying an initial combat air patrol sortie, refueling and rearming at an 
M-FARP, flying another sortie, resetting again at an M-FARP, flying a third sortie, 
and then recovering to the sea base. Each F-35 would load missiles and six tons of 
fuel after each sortie. Together, then, the three M-FARPs would require resupply 
of 336 tons of fuel and up to 280 tons of containerized munitions each day.
Depending on the number of transportation and other vehicles deployed 
ashore to connect the MDSs to their M-FARPs, and on whether the F-35s bed-
ded down on the sea base or an expeditionary airfield ashore, the total tonnage 
of fuel required to support the ground and air elements of DSOs would range 
from 544 to 1,337 tons per day, plus the nonfuel sustainment requirements of 
shore complements ranging from eight hundred to eighteen hundred personnel.9 
Zone 1               Zone 2         
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Robert C. Owen, 2015 
Figure 2: Air mobility-supported 
M-FARP laydown map 
FIGURE 2
AIR MOBILITY–SUPPORTED M-FARP LAYDOWN MAP
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Whatever the basing model, satisfying these requirements likely would consume 
the lift capacity of almost all of a MEB’s rotary-wing transport aircraft (CH-53Ks 
and MV-22s), amphibious craft, and trucks.10
Consequently, relying on MEB organic transportation assets to support DSOs 
could pose significant operational risks for Marine and joint commanders. Most 
importantly, tying DSOs to organic capabilities could limit the operational flex-
ibility and overall responsiveness of the MAGTF in an unfolding campaign. 
Tailoring the MAGTF to support such an unusually large complement of F-35s 
likely would require leaving some of its normal complements of air- and ground-
combat and support assets and personnel ashore to make room for additional 
F-35Bs and their support equipment and personnel. That, and the debarkation 
of so many vehicles and personnel ashore, could increase the time needed for the 
MAGTF to reconfigure and deploy for other missions elsewhere in a theater of 
operations.
An “organic” approach to DSO support also would increase the vulnerability 
of sea bases and transportation connectors to detection and attack. Trucks driv-
ing perhaps hundreds of miles between MDSs and shifting M-FARPs would be 
subject to the normal hazards of travel on sometimes primitive road systems, 
and vulnerable to long-range attacks at choke points and to harassment by SOF 
and locals sympathetic or beholden to the enemy. The short operating ranges of 
amphibious craft and CH-53 and MV-22 rotary-wing aircraft carrying externally 
slung loads of fuel bladders and missile containers would restrict the maneuver 
space available to ships in the sea base to within twenty-five to fifty nautical miles 
of their supported MDSs.11 Thus, enemies detecting the presence of M-FARPs in 
an area would not have very far to look for their support ships, MDSs, and choke 
points along surface lines of communication. Reasonably, they would realize 
that striking those relatively fixed and thus vulnerable targets would be a more 
remunerative strategy for shutting down DSOs than expending precious ISR and 
long-range strike assets to snipe at elusive M-FARPs.
OPTIONS FOR MITIGATING LOGISTICAL RISKS
There are at least three options for reducing the logistical risks inherent in DSOs.
First, the Marine Corps could increase the size of supporting sea bases. For 
example, adding the twenty-aircraft capacity of an America-class amphibious 
FIGURE 3
NOTIONAL F-35B COMBAT AIR PATROL SCHEDULE 
CAP CAP CAP
Ship ShipFARP FARP
Source: System Planning and Analysis, “STOVL Operations,” p. 37.
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assault ship (LHA) to a sea base could allow a MEB to support expanded F-35B 
operations with minimal reconfiguration of its other ships. The MEB, conse-
quently, would remain ready for quick application to other missions.
Second, the Marines could allocate KC-130Js to carry some or all aviation 
sustainment supplies directly into supported M-FARPs. The KC-130s’ ability to 
operate on multilane highways, damaged air bases, or unpaved airstrips would 
allow them to deliver support directly to or very near almost any location em-
ployed by F-35Bs. The advantages of this approach would be a reduction in shore 
complements and the risks associated with surface transportation between MDSs 
and M-FARPs.
The third option would be for Marines to draw on Air Force air-mobility as-
sets to provide direct or near-direct support to the M-FARPs. The obvious advan-
tage of this is that the air component’s tanker and transport forces have greater 
range and capacity than organic Marine lift assets.
Each of these options offers significant advantages to DSO planners; but they 
also present significant concerns.
Expanding sea bases to support F-35B operations would present commanders 
with several operational and risk challenges. The first is finding a “spare” LHA 
and supporting ships somewhere in the world that could arrive on the scene of 
DSOs in a timely manner without imposing offsetting risks on the readiness of 
other MAGTFs. However, even presuming that operational urgency justified 
such a move, expanding a sea base would not mitigate the vulnerability of its 
ships or of the MEB’s transportation assets ashore to long-range attack. In short, 
bringing in additional ships would be more about preserving the flexibility and 
responsiveness of the MAGTF than about improving the viability of DSOs.
FIGURE 4
Two J-35Bs prepare to refuel from a Marine KC-130J 
USMC photo
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Although applying Marine KC-130Js to M-FARP support could both enhance 
MAGTF readiness and reduce risks, the Marine airlift fleet generally is inadequate 
to the task. C-130J payload-distance characteristics often will fall short of need 
in theaters that are geographically expansive, such as the Asia-Pacific and Africa. 
For illustration, “Js” flying unrefueled, 2,800 nm round-trip missions between 
Tinian, an island outside the range of China’s current MRBMs and land-based 
cruise missiles, and M-FARPs on the Philippine island of Luzon could deliver a 
maximum load of fifteen tons per sortie. C-130s operating from expeditionary 
bases outside the range of Chinese gorilla strikes but within range of heavy mis-
sile attacks—say, over the 1,380 nm round-trip between General Santos Airport 
in southern Mindanao and the Luzon M-FARPs—could deliver twenty-two tons 
per sortie. From a conservative estimate that air transports would have to deliver 
about 666 tons of cargo per day (336 for aviation fuel, 280 for munitions, fifty 
for all else), the impact of the distances involved and the C-130’s payload-range 
performance becomes clear. On the basis of the data in table 1, a presumption of 
only one sortie per day per aircraft, and an 80 percent aircraft availability rate, the 
Marines would have to deploy fifty-six of their worldwide fleet of around sixty 
KC-130Js to support the Luzon M-FARPs. Assuming the same data, except now 
a two-sortie-per-day rate, twenty-eight C-130s would be needed to support the 
mission from Mindanao. Moreover, those C-130 units probably would have to 
conduct their own version of DSOs to survive operations within the enemy mis-
sile ring, with all the logistical burdens that would imply.12
It is also worth considering that, while the cargo decks of KC-130s would be 
capable of accommodating all the sustainment supplies and most of the vehicles 
M-FARPs would need, they would not be capable of handling some critical as-
sets. These would include LVSR SIXCON refuelers (critical for getting fuel across 
rough terrain), fully assembled seven-ton trucks, and all-terrain forklifts. They 
also could not carry slat-armored light assault vehicles and some civil engineer-
ing equipment that might be needed to open and defend M-FARPs and lines 
of communication. The reality is that the Marine C-130 fleet is too small and 
limited in its cargo-handling features to deploy and sustain DSOs fully under the 
circumstances discussed above.
At first glance, the big transports and tanker/transports in the Air Force’s 
global fleet appear to be a ready solution to the problem of reducing risks to 
sea bases and personnel during DSOs. Consisting of around 220 C-17 and 350 
C-130 transports and fifty-nine KC-10 and four hundred KC-135 tankers, with 
KC-46 tankers to be added soon, the gross capacity of the mobility fleet dwarfs 
the most ambitious DSO requirements. Ten KC-46s flying 1.5 missions per day 
out of Tinian, for instance, could satisfy the 666-ton logistical requirements of 
the notional Luzon M-FARPs, and offer the added flexibility of aerial refueling.13 
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Flying the same profiles, seven C-17s could do the job, although without offer-
ing the AR option. In combination, then, relatively small numbers of Air Force 
air-mobility aircraft could obviate the need to keep sea bases close to shore and 
to put hundreds of Marines at risk driving and protecting trucks between MDSs 
and M-FARPs.
Unfortunately, the interplay of the payload-range and airfield infrastructure 
requirements of the Air Force’s current and planned air-mobility fleet would 
limit its ability to support directly the austere M-FARP clusters favored by DSO 
planners. The big C-17s in the fleet can bring a lot of fuel and supplies into 
short and unsurfaced or weakly paved runways; however, just a few landing and 
takeoff passes will render such airstrips unusable through rutting and gouging.14 
Air Force C-130s could get into most M-FARPs, but they would suffer the same 
range, payload, and cargo-dimension limitations as their Marine cousins. Even 
worse, from a DSO perspective, all Air Force long-range tankers are modified 
airliners. As such, they are efficient load carriers, but capable of operating only 
from first-class airfields possessing long, hard-surfaced runways, taxiways, and 
parking areas. In many cases, therefore, joint air components will not be capable 
of transporting adequate amounts of cargo and fuel over theater distances and de-
livering them directly into M-FARPs. To the extent that these shortfalls in direct 
delivery capacity oblige MAGTF commanders still to put people and vehicles on 
the ground to move supplies from MDSs and big airfields to M-FARPs, the op-
portunities offered by air mobility to enhance operational flexibility and reduce 
risks will be lost.
MITIGATING THE AIR-MOBILITY SHORTFALL
Despite its present limitations, the potential of air-mobility support to mitigate 
the operational and logistical risks of DSOs justifies a search for ways to mitigate 
its inadequacies in support of M-FARPs. Of course, to be useful in the current 
financial environment, any opportunity considered must prima facie promise to 
improve operational capabilities significantly while imposing minimal or even 
reduced burdens on defense budgets.
These considerations suggest at least two courses of action worth pursuing.
First, Marine and Air Force logistical and operational experts must figure 
out how to get the most from the existing air-mobility fleet in the DSO context. 
This effort must include studies, discussions, and exercises that examine the full 
operational, logistical, and threat contexts of DSOs in the presence of moderate-
to-high A2/AD threats. Such a learning process would improve the ability of all 
parties to use creative combinations of Marine and Air Force lift assets to conduct 
DSOs in a wider range of places than currently possible, and burden the budget 
only with the costs of thinking and training.
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Second, the joint community should consider adjusting the air-mobility fleet 
to include an increment of aircraft better suited to support DSOs. At minimum, 
such an aircraft should have payload-range and cargo cabin dimensions suitable 
for transporting all DSO logistical requirements over strategic distances (mean-
ing from bases outside the range of all, or at least most, enemy missile and aircraft 
strikes) and delivering them directly to or very near M-FARPs. Support from 
such an aircraft would allow Marine commanders to conduct maximal DSOs 
from the widest range of locations. Such aircraft also would improve the mobility 
fleet’s capacity to support other operations requiring logistical throughput di-
rectly to points of need/employment, such as Army and Marine deep-maneuver 
operations, and resupply of air bases damaged or under the threat of damage by 
enemy A2/AD operations.15 The utility and survivability of such a system would 
be further enhanced if it also possessed AR capabilities.
CASE STUDY
This section presents a case study to illustrate the leverage provided by a medium-
weight, austere airfield–capable tanker/transport aircraft to DSOs. It is simplistic; 
clearly a full analysis of all the relevant mobility options available is beyond the 
scope of this article. But by providing an analysis of the effect of integrating Air-
bus A400Ms into DSOs, it should at least illustrate the value of this type of aircraft 
to operations in regions characterized by sparse airfield infrastructures.
The A400M is an “outsize” military transport/tanker aircraft capable of oper-
ating into virtually any airfield or multilane highway strip usable by the C-130. 
FIGURE 5
A400M in flight
Courtesy of Airbus
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In airlift parlance, outsize 
refers to an aircraft that 
has larger cargo deck 
cross-section dimen-
sions than a standard 
m i l i t ar y  4 6 3 L  c argo 
pallet. In this case, the 
A400’s cabin, includ-
ing the loading ramp, is 
74ʹ length × 13ʹ width 
× 12.6 ʹ  height (mini-
mum), while a standard-
length Marine Corps 
C-130J’s similar dimen-
sions are 50ʹ × 10ʹ × 9ʹ, including the loading ramp. The A400M’s greater internal 
volume and up to forty-one-ton payload enable it to carry all the logistic vehicles, 
engineering equipment, and combat vehicles that DSOs are likely to require.
A400s provide a valid—and, realistically speaking, an unavoidable—baseline 
for this analysis, not because it is impossible to imagine a better design for DSO 
support, but because A400s offer the only option in this class of aircraft likely to 
be available to the U.S. Air Force for the next twenty or more years. The mori-
bund Antonov AN-70 and the developmental Xian Y-20 are in the same class as 
the A400M, but are not likely candidates for the United States to acquire. For its 
part, the Air Force abandoned successful programs to develop outsize, short-
takeoff-or-landing transports, the YC-14 and YC-15, in the late 1970s in favor of 
developing the C-17, a design that represented a greater trade-off of short-field 
capabilities for increased range and payload. While the service has studied the 
issue numerous times since, it has taken no concrete action to develop a new 
type of theater airlifter. Similarly, tanker aircraft based on repurposed airliner 
designs are not suitable. Importantly, one of the Air Force’s most recent assess-
ments of options for acquiring a new theater airlifter found that even a modest 
acquisition program carried thirty-year life-cycle costs of $62–$128 billion. The 
Air Force’s study also found that purchasing an outsize “conventional takeoff and 
landing” aircraft (one possessing performance characteristics similar to those of 
the A400M) was the least expensive near-term option for enhancing support for 
Army deep-maneuver forces, apart from simply buying more C-17s and C-130s.16 
So, the analysis below is based on the A400M, in full awareness that the other 
option—building a new aircraft—remains on the table, although the experience 
of acquiring the C-17 suggests it could take ten to fifteen or more years from 
program approval to get the first squadron operationally ready.
FIGURE 6
A400M refueling F-18s 
Airbus Defense and Space 2015; Photo by Master Films / A. Doumenjou, used with permission
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The case examined here is postulated on an escalating conflict over Chinese 
base building and oil drilling in the South China Sea, and efforts by the com-
mander of U.S. Pacific Command (CDRUSPACOM) to deter Chinese action. 
In such a situation, if deterrence fails, CDRUSPACOM will want to have forces 
postured to seize the operational initiative anywhere along the Pacific Rim. Ac-
cordingly, CDRUSPACOM orders his Marine component commander to posture 
his on-scene MEB to support a reinforced component of thirty-six F-35Bs for 
high-intensity DSOs from a network of M-FARPs (see figure 2) on the island 
of Luzon. These operations could range from presence patrols over the central 
South China Sea to strike operations on its periphery. The PACOM commander 
further orders that the F-35Bs available be deployed as rapidly as possible, even as 
the MEB continues its organization and embarkation activities at Guam. Seeking 
further to preserve the readiness of the MEB for rapid movements in response 
to unfolding events, CDRUSPACOM directs his air-component commander to 
deploy an expeditionary group of A400Ms to an agile base complex around the 
Bohol Sea area to deploy and sustain DSO units and operations to the north.17 
As part of this commitment, the A400M force also will conduct AR operations in 
the vicinity of refueling track 1 (RT 1), west of the F-35B FARP complex. As soon 
as possible, the MEB and its sea base position themselves in a relatively secure 
maneuver area east of the central Philippines, from where rotary-wing assets can 
move relief personnel, fresh food, aircraft parts, and other light items to and from 
the M-FARPs.
Given this complex set of requirements, the Marines would posture their DSO 
force to reflect the robust air-mobility support available. Accordingly, the force 
laydown does not include MDSs and long road lines of communication between 
them and the M-FARPs. Few or no dedicated long-haul transportation assets go 
ashore. Instead, the Marine commander plans on air-deploying four complete 
M-FARP teams from Guam to Luzon, each postured to support up to twenty-
four F-35B sorties per day from highway airstrips, and possessing the organic 
transportation assets needed to be fully mobile, including rolling storage of a 
day’s supply of fuel and munitions. With all assets and supplies on vehicles, each 
M-FARP team is capable of breaking down and departing an M-FARP site in one 
hour, driving up to twenty miles to a new site in another hour, and setting back up 
for operations in a third hour. Thus, each M-FARP is expected to shift locations at 
least daily. Generally, any two M-FARP teams can support the pace of sustained 
F-35B patrol operations while the others are in motion or resting their personnel. 
All might be required to support offensive and defensive surges, but only for a few 
hours per day. The general complement of each M-FARP team is 150–60 person-
nel, four heavy LVSR SIXCON refueling trucks, sixteen seven-ton cargo trucks, 
eight MK970 five-thousand-gallon refueling trailers, thirty-three vehicles of the 
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high-mobility multipurpose vehicle type, a large all-terrain forklift, and about a 
dozen miscellaneous trailers.18
The A400Ms working out of the Bohol Sea area turn out to be well suited to 
the mission of supporting DSOs. About twenty-eight A400M sorties suffice to 
move the 750 tons or so of vehicles and supplies needed to put an M-FARP in 
place and ready for the first day’s operation.19 A modest commitment of twenty 
A400Ms based around the Bohol Sea area could transport the first M-FARP team 
from Guam to Luzon in twenty-four hours, and move all four teams in just over 
three days. Once full-scale operations began, as few as ten to twelve A400M sor-
ties per day could deliver the 666 tons of daily replenishment supplies needed by 
the M-FARP teams to support a combined daily tempo of twenty-eight F-35B 
missions, each stopping twice at an M-FARP to pick up full loads of fuel and mu-
nitions (see figure 3). Further, since these aircraft deliver their loads directly to, 
or very near to, the FARPs, their use eliminates the need to keep sea bases close 
inshore for their short-range amphibious and rotary-wing connectors to supple-
ment the bulk logistics flow, and they eliminate the need for long, potentially 
vulnerable overland supply routes.
In comparison with the scenario laid out above, an effort to move and sustain 
this force by a combination of C-17s and C-130s would be more complex, would 
involve more sorties, and would increase operational risk. Moving the four M-
FARP teams from Guam directly to their initial operational locations would 
require approximately 176 KC-130 sorties, plus a significant number of A400Ms 
or C-17s to move vehicles too large or too heavy to fit into a C-130.20 Relying on 
C-17s to deploy the M-FARP teams and their daily supply requirements would 
greatly reduce the required sorties for the mission; but there are only eight devel-
oped airfields on Luzon capable of handling C-17s on a sustained basis; all are in 
or near major cities; and most have limited parking areas.21 So aircraft flying into 
them on a repetitive basis would be visible to hundreds of thousands of people 
with cell phones, including many enemy nationals, and they would park at easily 
predicted and targeted spots.22 Conducting sustained resupply operations into 
those airfields would undermine the flexibility and security of the MAGTF and 
its sea base by obliging it to debark substantial numbers of vehicles and person-
nel to transport supplies out to M-FARPs that could be a hundred miles or more 
away from an active aerial port of debarkation. A DSO logistics concept based 
on even minimal use of major airfields, therefore, might force sea bases back 
inshore to support the increased supply flows incumbent in the enlarged ground 
transportation effort, or drastically increase the amount of airlift required. In 
either case, much of the logistical, operational, and security benefits to be gained 
by bringing Air Force air-mobility aircraft into the picture would be lost.
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An additional benefit of operating out-
size transport/tankers from the agile base 
network around the Bohol Sea would be the 
availability of AR support for the F-35Bs. 
Presuming, as an example, a sequence of 
three four-plane formations taking off at 
one-hour intervals to provide continu-
ous coverage in one area, and potentially 
expending their advanced medium-range 
air-to-air missiles (i.e., AMRAAMs) on each 
sortie, the operational profile could look like 
this: each formation would depart the sea 
base, top off its fuel from A400Ms at RT 1 
(see figure 7), patrol for one hour, proceed 
to an M-FARP for fuel and reloads, proceed 
back to its patrol area for an hour, return 
again to the M-FARP, patrol again for forty-
five minutes, top off at RT 1, and then fly 
back to the sea base. Flying this pattern, the 
three formations would produce 2.8 hours 
of on-station time for each flight and cover the patrol area for 8.5 hours. For their 
part, the tankers would land at the M-FARPs as necessary to off-load munitions 
and recharge fuels-support vehicles. The basic logistics effort would be as follows.
Using the data in table 1, the chart below reflects the comparative capabili-
ties of the A400M and the KC-130J to support this scenario from the Bohol Sea 
area.
RT	1	
Sea	base	
Tanker	agile-
basing	complex	
F-35B	FARP		
complex	
200	nm	
Figure 7: FARP scenario map FIGURE 7
FARP SCENARIO MAP
Munitions required at M-FARPs 117 tons
Fuel required at M-FARPs 106 tons
AR fuel required (before first orbit and after last) 77 tons
Aircraft A400M KC-130J
Sorties required  9  18
Aircraft required  7  15
Fuel consumed by tanker/transport aircraft (thousand lbs.)  333  384
Ratio of fuel consumed / delivered to F-35Bs  .86  1.06
Required tanker/transport parking spots at each M-FARP  1  2
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LIGHTNING RAIDS
Before summarizing the implications of this discussion of the integration of 
common-user air-mobility support into the DSO concept, it will be valuable 
to consider an important variation on that theme: the raid. There is a long his-
tory of air forces extending the practical depth of their offensive operations by 
teaming transports and tactical aircraft to establish temporary operating loca-
tions from which to conduct small-scale raids deep into enemy territories. The 
Marines, of course, are zealous practitioners of the art. Recently, the U.S. Air 
Force and Royal Air Force (RAF) have revived their interests in this concept. 
USAF experiments with the “Rapid-X” concept involve pairing two to four 
fighters with a single C-17 carrying the personnel, equipment, fuel, and muni-
tions needed to generate sorties from isolated locations. Often this team would 
conduct operations in a “flex basing” mode: sitting at a particular airfield just 
long enough to launch a few sorties, then moving on to another location— 
always a step ahead of an enemy’s targeting cycle.23 Similarly, the RAF has re-
ceived briefings from Airbus Defense and Space Corporation on using A400Ms 
to support forward fighter operations. In the Airbus scenario, an individual 
A400M or teams of them would deploy to austere, forward airfields, each with 
enough fuel and munitions to regenerate two to four fighters for an additional 
strike sortie. By eliminating return trips to distant main bases for rearming, this 
concept can nearly double the number of strike sorties available from a given 
force of F-35Bs over given spans of time, while nearly halving the amount of fuel 
burned.24
Once again, medium-weight, short-field tanker/transport aircraft offer at-
tractive opportunities to exploit these linked transport-fighter and forward-
operating-location concepts. Teams of A400M-equivalent aircraft and F-35Bs 
could operate into and from asphalt and concrete runways and highway strips of 
four thousand feet in length or less, presuming the fighters used vertical-rolling-
takeoff-and-landing (VRL) procedures.25 A pairing of C-17s and conventional- 
takeoff-and-landing F-35As and Cs, in comparison, would need runways ap-
proximately seven thousand feet in length for conventional fighter takeoffs and 
landings, and with high load-bearing capacities to accommodate the heavy trans-
ports. C-130s can match the airfield performance of the A400M, of course, but 
their operational radii generally would be smaller in support of DSOs, and they 
would require more sorties to support a given effort.
IMPLICATIONS
Particularly if they are augmented by medium-weight, austere airfield–capable 
tanker/transports, the potential benefits of using Air Force air-mobility forces to 
support DSOs include these:
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1. Providing a flexible and reliable option for supporting DSOs in a wide 
range of situations
2. Preserving the operational readiness of an embarked MEB by substantially 
reducing the size of the onshore forces needed to support DSOs
3. Reducing the vulnerability of the sea base and onshore forces to A2/AD 
threats
4. Reducing the need to move carrier battle groups into forward threat zones 
to extend their strike range, contribute to extended deterrence, or protect 
Marines ashore
5. Facilitating flexible deterrence by permitting the placement of strong 
and survivable air forces inside enemy threat rings; indeed, air mobility–
supported deployments of DSO forces may in many cases be the only 
effective means to exploit the short windows of opportunity available to 
deter enemy actions that might convert confrontations into wars
6. Improving the effectiveness of the overall air-mobility fleet in support of 
DSOs and other important missions, such as supporting land force deep-
maneuver and battle-damaged air bases
The way forward seems clear. For a start, Marine DSO and Air Force mobility 
planners need to meet, learn each other’s “language” and operational issues, and 
then rigorously examine the ability of the program-of-record fleet to support 
DSOs in a resilient and operationally effective manner. This discussion should 
include Marine and Army ground-warfare experts, since the final answer on 
whether the Department of Defense should acquire a new transport aircraft will 
rest in part on its relative value to requirements in addition to DSOs.26 Finally—
and particularly if an international design comes into the spotlight—it would not 
hurt to involve interested congressional, Defense Department, and civil experts 
in the discussion from the start. In the quest for offsets and trade-offs to finance 
a new fleet segment, the support of those experts will be important to the out-
come of the unavoidable political fights with the stakeholders and proponents 
of existing aircraft programs. In other words, this is a big issue, but one that is 
strategically important to the warfighting capabilities of the Marines and, indeed, 
all the service components.
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